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BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA v.
GARRETT. A FLAWED STANDARD YIELDS A
PREDICTABLE RESULT
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,1 the
United States Supreme Court held that private parties could not sue
states in federal court for monetary damages under Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the ADA) because Congress
did not validly abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
when it passed that statute.2 Congress can only so abrogate when it
properly invokes its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
pursuant to Section 5 of that provision.' The five-Justice Garrett major-
ity concluded that Title I was not valid Section 5 legislation because:
(1) Congress did not respond to an identified pattern of unconstitu-
tional employment discrimination by states against the disabled; and
(2) the statute prohibited too much constitutional state action.4
Title I is the latest in a series of federal statutes that have failed
the Court's Section 5 test.5 In all but one of these decisions, the Jus-
tices have split 5-4 along ideological lines, with Justices Stevens, Sou-
l. 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
2. Id. at 960, 967-68. Title 1 of the ADA is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117
(1994). The Eleventh Amendment provides, "The judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
3. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 967-68; see infra notes 27-36 and accompanying text (discussing
Congress's abrogation power). Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states
from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" or
"deny[ing] .. .any person within [their] jurisdiction[s] the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 5 of the same Amendment gives Congress the
"power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id. § 5.
4. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 967-68.
5. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626-27 (2000) (holding that 42 U.S.C.
§ 13981 (1994), part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 40302, 108 Stat. 1941-1942, was not valid Section 5 legislation); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Re-
gents, 528 U.S. 62, 91-92 (2000) (finding the same for the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. 1998)); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla.
Prepaid Postsec. Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999) (finding the same for the
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567, amending 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994)); Fla. Prepaid Postsec. Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999) (finding the same for the Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(d) & 296(a) (1994 & Supp. 1998)); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (finding the same for the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994)).
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ter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in dissent. 6 Those Justices continue to
maintain that Congress can abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment im-
munity with legislation that it passes pursuant to its powers under Arti-
cle I of the Constitution-a notion which the other five Justices
rejected in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.7 In his Garrett dissent, however,
Justice Breyer assumed the validity of Seminole Tribe and focused his
attacks on the Court's Section 5 test.8 In doing so, he was more suc-
cessful in attacking the structure of that test, rather than the Garrett
Court's application of it. This discrepancy is attributable to the fact
that, although the Section 5 test is fundamentally flawed, the Court in
Garrett applied that test-flaws and all-in the same way that it had in
earlier cases. Whether one accepts that test as valid or not, it is diffi-
cult to deny that the ADA had obvious shortcomings under the test as
it was formulated prior to Garrett. Thus, while the result in Garrett was
ultimately wrong because of the Court's ill-conceived Section 5 formu-
lation, it was nonetheless a predictable outcome.
I. THE CASE
In 1994, Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse and Director of Nurs-
ing, OB/Gyn/Neonatal Services at the University of Alabama in Bir-
mingham Hospital, was diagnosed with breast cancer. 9  She
subsequently underwent a lumpectomy, radiation treatment, and
chemotherapy, which forced her to take extended leave from her
job."° When she returned to work in July 1995, Garrett's supervisor
told her that she was going to have to give up her director position. 1
Thereafter, she was transferred to a lower paying position as a nurse
manager. 12
6. The one exception was City of Boerne, in which the Court developed the test it has
used in subsequent Section 5 cases. In that case, none of the Justices dissented from the
Court's Section 5 formulation. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
id. at 565 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
7. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, restated his objections to Seminole Tfibe last year. See Kime4 528 U.S. at 93 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated: "In my opinion, Congress' power to authorize federal
remedies against state agencies that violate federal statutory obligations is coextensive with
its power to impose those obligations on the States in the first place. Neither the Eleventh
Amendment nor the doctrine of sovereign immunity places any limit on that power." Id.
8. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 969-76 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
9. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 961.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
[VOL. 60:393
BOARD OF TRUSTEES V. GARRETT
Milton Ash was a security officer for the Alabama Department of
Youth Services (the Department)." During the course of his employ-
ment, the Department ignored two requests that Ash had made for
special accommodations on account of medical conditions. 4 After he
filed a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Ash noticed that his scores on performance evaluations
were lower than they had been before he filed the claim.' "
Garrett and Ash filed separate suits in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Alabama, both seeking monetary
damages for violations of Titles I and II of the ADA.' 6 The defendants
in both cases filed for summary judgment, claiming that, as state enti-
ties, they were entitled to immunity from the suits under the Eleventh
Amendment."7 In ajoint opinion, the district court granted both mo-
tions and dismissed both cases.1 8 On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 9 In a case decided ear-
lier that year by the Eleventh Circuit, the court had held that the ADA
was valid Section 5 legislation and that Congress, therefore, had abro-
gated states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it had passed the
statute.2" Bound by this precedent, the court rejected the state of Ala-
bama's immunity defense." The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider whether individuals may sue states for money damages in
federal court under Titles I and II of the ADA.2 2
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment Framework
The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t] he Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
13. Id.
14. Id. Ash suffered from chronic asthma and sleep apnea and requested special ac-
commodations to minimize adverse reactions to both conditions. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Garrett v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. in Birmingham, 989 F. Supp. 1409, 1410
(N.D. Ala. 1998).
18. Id. at 1412.
19. Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 193 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir.
1999).
20. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (11th Cir. 1998), rev'd in part,
528 U.S. 62, cert. granted sub nom. Fla. Dep't of Corrs. v. Dickson, 525 U.S. 1121, cert. dis-
missed, 528 U.S. 1184 (2000).
21. Garrett, 193 F.3d at 1218.
22. 529 U.S. 1065 (2000).
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State."2" Despite this language, the Supreme Court, in Hans v. Louisi-
ana,24 held that the Amendment also prohibited citizens from suing
their own states in federal court.25 Since then, the Court has recog-
nized exceptions to the immunity doctrine, one of which allows Con-
gress to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in
legislation.26
1. Congress's Abrogation Power.-The Court first recognized Con-
gress's abrogation power in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. 7 In that case, the
Court held that state employees could sustain a federal action against
the state of Connecticut under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII) because Congress had validly abrogated the state's Elev-
enth Amendment immunity using its power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.28 Thirteen years later, in Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co.,29 a plurality of the Court held that Congress had suc-
cessfully abrogated the commonwealth of Pennsylvania's immunity
when it had passed legislation pursuant to the Commerce Clause.3 °
As a result of Union Gas, Congress's abrogation power was almost limit-
less, because most federal legislation is supported by the Commerce
Clause.
Section 5 and Article I remained valid means of Eleventh Amend-
ment abrogation until 1996, when the Court, split 5-4, reversed Union
Gas in Seminole Tribe v. Florida."' The majority in that case adopted the
Hans Court's reasoning that, despite its silence on the matter, the
Constitution protects a state's immunity from suits brought by both its
citizens and non-citizens and that, when an early Supreme Court deci-
sion contravened this concept of immunity by permitting a suit against
the state of Georgia by a citizen of South Carolina, Congress crafted
the Eleventh Amendment to reverse that decision and restore the
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
24. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
25. Id. at 21.
26. See infra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
27. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
28. Id. at 456. Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 & Supp.
1997). For the relevant portions of the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra note 3.
29. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996).
30. Id. at 23. The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power "[t]o regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
31. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Justices Stevens and Souter filed separate dissenting opinions
in Seminole Tribe, with Justices Ginsburg and BreyerjoiningJustice Souter's opinion. See id.
at 76 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 100 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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original broad version of state sovereign immunity.3 2 Thus, even
though the claimant tribe was suing the state of Florida, of which the
tribe's members were citizens, its claim-that the state violated the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (the Act) when it failed to negotiate a
gaming compact in good faith-could only proceed if Congress had
abrogated the state's immunity when it passed the Act. " To make
this determination, the Court observed that it must "ask two questions:
first, whether Congress . . . 'unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to
abrogate the immunity,' and second, whether Congress... acted 'pur-
suant to a valid exercise of power."' 34 The Court held that the Act
failed the second prong because Congress had passed it pursuant to
its powers under Article I, which the Court deemed an invalid means
of Eleventh Amendment abrogation.35 As a result, Section 5 is now
the primary means by which Congress can wield its abrogation
power.-
6
2. Limiting the Scope of Section 5.-In City of Boerne v. Flores,3 7 the
Court narrowly interpreted Section 5's scope and held that Congress
had not validly enforced the Fourteenth Amendment when it passed
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). 3 With
RFRA, Congress sought to reverse Employment Division v. Smith, in
which the Court held that a facially neutral, generally applicable Ore-
gon law that outlawed use of the drug peyote was constitutional de-
spite the incidental burden that the law placed on the claimant Native
Americans' free exercise of religion.4" Writing for the City of Boerne
32. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69-72 (arguing that Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419 (1793) was "contrary to the well-understood meaning of the Constitution").
33. Id. at 47. For the Court's abrogation discussion, see id. at 55-73. The Act is codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
34. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
35. Id. at 59-73 (discussing flaws in Union Gas and overruling that decision).
36. While it is still an open question, many commentators have argued that Congress
can also abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it legislates pursuant to its
powers under the enforcement provisions of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique, 50 VAND. L.
REV. 1137, 1227 n.424 (1997) ("Presumably, the reasoning of Fitzpatrick applies to authority
granted to Congress under other post-Civil War amendments, such as Section 2 of the
Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments."); William A. Fletcher, The Eleventh Amendment:
Unfinished Business, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 843, 849 n.49 (2000) ("It appears that Congress
may also abrogate the I1th Amendment when legislating under Section 2 of the 15th
Amendment.").
37. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
38. Id. at 536. RFRA is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
39. 495 U.S. 872 (1990).
40. Id. at 890. The Smith Court had declined to apply the traditional standard for
claims alleging unconstitutional burdens on free exercise rights. Id. at 884-85. In re-
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majority, Justice Kennedy noted that Section 5 "is 'a positive grant of
legislative power' to Congress" and that "[1] egislation which deters or
remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Con-
gress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct
which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative
spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.' ''4" Justice
Kennedy qualified these observations, however, by explaining that the
enforcement power was not limitless, as it "extends only to 'en-
forc[ing]' the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment," not to "de-
cree[ing] the substance of [its] restrictions on the States. '42 While
the City of Boerne majority conceded that "the line between measures
that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that
make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern,
and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies," it
nonetheless concluded that "the distinction exists and must be ob-
served."4 The Court explained that for legislation to be properly re-
medial, there had to be "a congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end.
4 4
Applying this Section 5 test to RFRA, the City of Boerne Court con-
cluded that the statute lacked the requisite nexus "between the means
used and the ends to be achieved," because, in the first place, Con-
gress had failed to compile a legislative record that evinced any "mod-
ern instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious
bigotry."45 In light of this lack of deliberately anti-religious state laws,
the Court next observed that RFRA's broad prohibitions on state ac-
tion made it "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or prevent-
ative object that it [could not] be understood as responsive to, or
sponse, Congress declared that one of the purposes of RFRA was "to restore the compel-
ling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise
of religion is substantially burdened." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1).
41. City of Boerne, 512 U.S. at 517, 518 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
651 (1966); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
42. Id. at 519 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)). By
dispelling the notion that Congress could enhance the Fourteenth Amendment's protec-
tions, the Court invalidated that popular interpretation of its decision in Morgan, in which
it had held that Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was a valid exercise of Con-
gress's Section 5 power. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 658; see also City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527-29
(concluding that such an interpretation of Morgan was not a "necessary" one "or even the
best one").
43. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20.
44. Id.
45. Id at 530.
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designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior."46 Justice Kennedy
noted that RFRA's "[s]weeping coverage ensure[d] its intrusion at
every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official ac-
tions of almost every description and regardless of subject matter."47
Justice Kennedy further observed that RFRA lacked the kind of provi-
sions that might have limited its scope enough to make it valid Section
5 legislation.48 To the City of Boerne majority, the fact that most of the
displaced state actions would have been valid under Smith "illus-
trate[d] the substantive alteration of [Smith's] holding attempted by
RFRA. "
49
B. Subsequent Applications of City of Boerne's Section 5 Test
1. Florida Prepaid.-The Court next applied its Section 5 test in
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank.5" In that case, the Court, split 5-4, held that the Eleventh
Amendment barred private-party federal actions against states under
the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (the
Patent Remedy Act) 51 because that law was not valid Section 5 legisla-
tion. 52 Following City of Boerne, the Court first sought to "identify the
Fourteenth Amendment 'evil' or 'wrong' that Congress intended to
remedy. '53 Finding sparse evidence that states were consistently deny-
ing individuals their property rights without due process of law, the
Florida Prepaid majority concluded that the Patent Remedy Act "[did]
not respond to a history of 'widespread and persisting deprivation of
constitutional rights' of the sort Congress faced in enacting proper
prophylactic § 5 legislation. '54 Because the problem to which Con-
gress purported to respond with the Patent Remedy Act was virtually
non-existent and because that law "made all States immediately ame-
nable to suit in federal court for all kinds of possible patent infringe-
46. Id. at 532.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 532-33 (noting that "limitations of this kind tend to ensure Congress' means
are proportionate to ends legitimate under § 5").
49. Id. at 534.
50. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
51. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(d), 296(a) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
52. 527 U.S. at 647 (concluding that "[t]he historical record and the scope of cover-
age .. .make it clear that the Patent Remedy Act cannot be sustained under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment"). Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Stevens's
dissenting opinion in Florida Prepaid. Id. at 648 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, the division
of Justices in Florida Prepaid mirrored that of Seminole Tribe. See supra note 31 (identifying
the Seminole Tribe dissenters).
53. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639-40.
54. Id. at 645 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526).
20011
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ment and for an indefinite duration," the Court also concluded that
the statute prohibited too much constitutional state action to make it
properly congruent and proportional under City of Boerne. 5
2. Section 5 and Civil Rights Legislation.-Less than a year after
College Savings Bank, the Court once again decided an Eleventh
Amendment abrogation case. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 6 the
issue was whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(the ADEA) was valid Section 5 legislation.5 7 Since the ADEA was a
major piece of civil rights legislation, Kimel marked the first time that
the Court applied City of Boerne's Section 5 test to a statute that Con-
gress had passed to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro-
tection Clause.
a. The Court's Equal Protection Jurisprudence.-In the sixty
years since the Court first suggested that it might subject laws that
discriminated against "discrete and insular minorities" to a "more
searching judicial scrutiny,"5 the Court has developed a three-tiered
system for analyzing state laws that draw classifications on the basis of
individual characteristics. Courts presume that most social and eco-
nomic legislation is constitutional unless it establishes such classifica-
tions in a manner not "rationally related to a legitimate state
interest."5 This rational basis standard is the lowest level of Equal
Protection scrutiny, and legislation almost always survives under its le-
nient requirements.60 Conversely, strict scrutiny, which courts apply
to legislation that treats individuals differently on the basis of suspect
classifications, such as race, alienage, and national origin, is the most
stringent of the three standards.6 Courts presume that such laws are
unconstitutional unless states prove that they are "suitably tailored to
serve a compelling state interest."6 2 The third standard is an interme-
55. Id. at 647.
56. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
57. See id. at 66-67. The ADEA is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
58. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
59. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); see also id.
(describing this standard as "the general rule" and explaining that "the Constitution
presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic
processes").
60. Cf FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 323 n.3 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (concluding that rational basis review is "tantamount to no review at all").
61. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 ("These factors are so seldom relevant to the achieve-
ment of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed
to reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not as wor-
thy or deserving as others.").
62. Id.
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diate level of heightened Equal Protection scrutiny applicable to laws
that draw classifications on the basis of quasi-suspect characteristics,
such as gender and illegitimacy.6 3 To satisfy this test, legislation must
be, in the case of gender, ."substantially related to a sufficiently impor-
tant governmental interest"6 4 or, in the case of illegitimacy, "'substan-
tially related to a legitimate state interest.' "65
b. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents.-Prior to Kimel, the
Supreme Court had consistently concluded that it would subject state
laws that discriminated on the basis of age to rational basis review.66
The Kimel Court reaffirmed its commitment to this standard and with
this lenient test as a backdrop ultimately concluded that the ADEA,
"through its broad restriction on the use of age as a discriminating
factor, prohibits substantially more state employment decisions and
practices than would likely be held unconstitutional under the appli-
cable equal protection, rational basis standard. '67 In so concluding,
the Kimel Court rejected the claimants' argument that the exceptions
to the ADEA's general prohibition on age discrimination in employ-
ment ensured that the statute was not unconstitutionally broad.68 Al-
though the exceptions made the ADEA's ban on discrimination "less
than absolute," the majority nonetheless observed that the statute's
"substantive requirements ... remain at a level akin to [the Court's]
heightened scrutiny cases under the Equal Protection Clause."'6 9
The Kimel Court next noted that the ADEA's sweeping prohibi-
tion of state age discrimination did "not alone provide the answer to
[its] § 5 inquiry," as "[d]ifficult and intractable problems often re-
quire powerful remedies."7 ° The Court concluded, however, that the
sparse evidence of discrimination in the statute's legislative history,
which consisted mainly of "isolated sentences clipped from floor de-
bates and legislative reports," did not justify Congress's sweeping re-
sponse.7 1 Thus, because Congress had "never identified any pattern
63. Id. at 440-41.
64. Id. at 441 (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 485 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)).
65. Id. (quoting Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982)).
66. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (concluding that rational basis
review is the appropriate Equal Protection standard for scrutinizing state laws that discrimi-
nate on the basis of age); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (same); Mass. Bd. of Ret.
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (per curiam) (same).
67. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86 (2000).
68. Id. at 86-88.
69. Id. at 87-88.
70. Id. at 88.
71. Id. at 89.
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of age discrimination by the States, much less any discrimination what-
soever that rose to the level of constitutional violation," the ADEA was
"an unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem. '7 2
C. Legislative and Judicial Treatment of the Disabled
1. The ADA.-When Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, it "in-
voke[d] the sweep of [its] authority, including the power to enforce
the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to
address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people
with disabilities."73 In so doing, Congress sought "to provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities."74 To ensure that the Elev-
enth Amendment would not stand in the way of this mandate,
Congress expressly provided that "State [s] shall not be immune under
[that provision] from an action in Federal or State court . . . for a
violation of [the ADA].""
Title I of the ADA applies to discrimination by employers.76
Under this Title, "[n]o covered entity [may] discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, ad-
vancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employ-
ment."77 Title I defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as a
person who "can perform the essential functions of the employ-
ment"78 and an "employer"-one of the "covered entit[ies]"-as any
"person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or
more employees." 79 Significantly, the ADA's definition of "person"
also expressly includes states.8"
While Title I prohibits employers from failing to provide the dis-
abled with equal treatment, it also requires states to take affirmative
steps to avoid violating the statute's ban on discrimination; that is,
states must make "reasonable accommodation [s]" for their disabled
employees.8" The statute limits this requirement, however, to in-
72. Id.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1994).
74. Id. § 12101 (b)(1).
75. Id. § 12202.
76. Id. §§ 12111-12117.
77. Id. § 12112(a).
78. Id. § 12111(8).
79. Id. § 12111(2), (5)(A).
80. Id. § 12111(7) (adopting the definition provided in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1994)).
81. Id. §§ 12111(9), 12112(b)(5)(A).
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stances in which the accommodations and modifications do not "im-
pose an undue hardship" on employers.
8 2
. The ADA's legislative history is voluminous and reflects years of
congressional research into the extent of the problem of disability dis-
crimination in America.8 3 That record evinces a long history of dis-
crimination against the disabled, which Congress summarized in the
list of findings in the ADA's statutory text.8 4 Among other things,
Congress observed that "individuals with disabilities are a discrete and
insular minority" that, "historically, society has tended to isolate and
segregate. '8 5 Furthermore, the disabled "continually encounter vari-
ous forms of discrimination" and have been "relegated to a position of
political powerlessness in our society."" That Congress described the
disabled as a "discrete and insular minority" has symbolic constitu-
tional significance, as courts subject laws that classify such minorities
to a heightened level of Equal Protection scrutiny.8 7 The Court, how-
ever, has never applied heightened scrutiny in this context; instead, it
has consistently held that rational basis review is the appropriate stan-
dard for analyzing state laws that classify individuals based on their
disabilities.8 8
2. Judicial Classification of the Disabled.-
a. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.-In City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,8 9 the Supreme Court con-
cluded, by a 6-3 majority, that the mentally retarded were not a quasi-
suspect class and therefore courts could not apply a heightened level
of Equal Protection scrutiny to laws singling them out for special treat-
ment.9 ° Writing for the majority, Justice White reasoned that, because
the mentally retarded were "different . . . in relevant respects" from
the rest of the population, "the States' interest in dealing with and
82. Id. §§ 12111 (10), 12112(b)(5)(A); see also 28 C.F.R§ 35.150 (1999) (allowing pub-
lic entities to avoid making modifications that would "result in a fundamental alteration in
the nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative
burdens").
83. See Timothy M. Cook, The Americans With Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64
TEMP. L. REv. 393, 393 nn.1-3 (1991) (listing the hearings that Congress held when it was
considering the ADA).
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a).
85. Id. § 12101 (a) (7), (2).
86. Id. § 12101 (a) (5), (7).
87. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 89-101 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's clas-
sification of the disabled for Equal Protection purposes).
89. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
90. Id at 442.
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providing for them is plainly a legitimate one.""' Reluctant to make
the kind of "substantive judgments" about legislation that a height-
ened level of Equal Protection scrutiny would require, the Cleburne
majority chose rational basis scrutiny to ensure that legislators would
have a level of flexibility in confronting the "difficult and often ...
technical matter" of how to treat the mentally retarded under the
law.9 2
The Court's decision to provide this leeway was influenced by its
determination that both federal and state legislators were dealing with
the unique problems of the mentally retarded "in a manner that be-
lie [d] a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need
for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary." For the Cleburne ma-
jority, the fact that society "expect[ed] and approve[d]" of legislation
that singled out the mentally retarded for special treatment demon-
strated "that governmental consideration of those differences in the
vast majority of situations is not only legitimate but also desirable.""
While the Court conceded that it was possible that most of the benefi-
cial legislation would have withstood heightened judicial scrutiny, it
reasoned that imposing that standard was not prudent, because
"merely requiring the legislature to justify its efforts [under height-
ened scrutiny] may lead it to refrain from acting at all." 5
After establishing that the mentally retarded were not a quasi-sus-
pect class, the Cleburne Court held that the municipal policy at issue in
the case, whereby the city had required special use permits for multi-
pie-dwelling facilities housing the mentally retarded but not for other
such facilities, was unconstitutional even under the lenient rational
basis standard. 6 The Court rejected the city's justifications for this
disparate treatment, concluding that all of the city's asserted interests,
which included allaying the concerns of local residents, protecting the
retarded individuals from harassment by neighborhood students, and
preventing overcrowding and potential fire hazards, were illegiti-
91. Id. (footnote omitted).
92. Id. at 442-43.
93. Id. at 443.
94. Id. at 444.
95. Id. The Court next provided two further justifications for its holding. First, it con-
cluded that the very fact that there was such widespread legislative response to the
problems of the mentally retarded "negate[d] any claim that [they] are politically power-
less in the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of lawmakers." Id. at 445.
Finally, Justice White noted that the Court was reluctant to classify the mentally retarded as
quasi-suspect because if it did so, it would almost certainly have to do the same for other
classes of individuals with immutable characteristics, such as the aged, the disabled, the
mentally ill, and the infirm. Id. at 44546.
96. Id. at 450.
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mate. 7 In the Court's final estimation, the permit program "rest[ed]
on an irrational prejudice.""8
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, sup-
ported the Court's rejection of the city's permit policy, but would have
reached that conclusion using heightened scrutiny.99 Justice Marshall
argued that the majority's purported application of traditional ra-
tional basis scrutiny was disingenuous because, if the Court had actu-
ally applied that exceedingly lenient test, "Cleburne's ordinance
surely would have been valid."' 00 He suggested that the Court's Equal
Protection formulation in Cleburne "hereafter be called 'second order'
rational-basis review," because the Court had applied "precisely the
sort of probing inquiry associated with heightened scrutiny" while si-
multaneously rejecting that designation.'
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
A. The Majority's Opinion
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, the Su-
preme Court, split 5-4, held that Title I of the ADA did not validly
abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity and therefore state
employees could not bring federal claims for monetary damages
against their employers under that provision." 2 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, joined byJustices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, first
noted that, in Cleburne, the Court had held that the rational basis test
was the appropriate Equal Protection standard for scrutinizing laws
that discriminated on the basis of disability."0 3 Nothing in the ensu-
ing discussion suggested that the Garrett Court gave any credence to
Justice Marshall's argument that Cleburne's formulation of the rational
basis test was abnormally strict. "[W]here a group possesses 'distin-
guishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the author-
ity to implement,"' the Court observed, "a State's decision to act on
the basis of those differences does not give rise to a constitutional
97. Id. at 448-50.
98. Id. at 450.
99. Id. at 455-56 (Marshall, J., concurring in part in the judgment and dissenting in
part).
100. Id. at 456.
101. Id. at 458.
102. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 967-68. Although the parties had alleged violations of both
Titles I and II of the ADA in district court, the Supreme Court refused to rule on the
constitutionality of Title II because the parties did not brief the question of whether Title
II covered employment discrimination. Id. at 960 n.1.
103. Id. at 963 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441
(1985)).
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violation."1 °4 Thus, the Court concluded that as long as state action
was rationally related to an asserted interest, states could "quite hard-
headedly-and perhaps hardheartedly-hold to job qualifications
which do not make allowance for the disabled."1 °5
With this Equal Protection formulation as a backdrop, the Court
next concluded that Title I of the ADA was not valid Section 5 legisla-
tion because: (1) Congress did not identify a pattern of constitutional
violations by states against their disabled employees; and (2) even if
such a pattern had existed, the provisions of Title I prohibited too
much constitutional state action to make them congruent and propor-
tional to the problem Congress sought to address with the ADA.106
On the question of whether Congress had uncovered a pattern of
state discrimination, the Court noted that the respondents' brief cited
only six examples of such discrimination from the ADA's legislative
history.'0 7 Although these examples demonstrated that some states
had failed to make the special accommodations for the disabled that
the ADA required, it was not clear to the Court that the states had
acted unconstitutionally under Cleburne.108 Even if all the cited exam-
ples represented unconstitutional discrimination, the Court con-
cluded that six instances did not amount to a pattern.10 9
Furthermore, the Court was unwilling to consider the information
contained in Appendix C to the Garrett opinion, which consisted of
first-hand accounts of employment discrimination in all fifty states." 0
Chief Justice Rehnquist dismissed these accounts as "unexamined
[and] anecdotal" and noted that they were not even reported to Con-
gress, but rather to a special task force investigating disability discrimi-
nation."1 The Court reasoned that if Congress had believed that the
task force information represented a pattern of unconstitutional dis-
crimination, it would have said so in the ADA's legislative history."12
That it did not was enough justification for the Court to conclude
104. Id.
105. Id. at 964.
106. Id. at 964-68.
107. Id. at 965.
108. See id. (noting that, while many of the instances that Congress cited in the ADA's
legislative history "evidence an unwillingness on the part of state officials to make the sort
of accommodations for the disabled" that the statute requires, the question "[w]hether
they were irrational under ... Cleburne is more debatable").
109. Id.
110. Id. at 966. For Appendix C, see id at 977-93.
111. Id. at 966.
112. Id.
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that, even if the task force information was worthy of consideration,
there was in fact no such pattern." 3
The Court next found in the alternative that even if a pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination by states existed, Title I was still not
valid Section 5 legislation because its prohibitions on constitutional
state action were too sweeping. 1 4 As support, the Court noted:
[W] hereas it would be entirely rational (and therefore con-
stitutional) for a state employer to conserve scarce financial
resources by hiring employees who are able to use existing
facilities, the ADA requires employers to "mak[e] existing fa-
cilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities."" 5
Although the Court conceded that there were exceptions to this ac-
commodation requirement, it nonetheless observed that the ADA pro-
hibited "a range of alternative responses" that were entirely
constitutional.'
1 6
The majority was also troubled by the fact that "l[t] he ADA ...
forbids 'utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration'
that disparately impact the disabled, without regard to whether such
action has a rational basis.""' The Court noted that disparate impact
alone was not enough to make a law unconstitutional under its Four-
teenth Amendment jurisprudence.' 18 Thus, even though the Court
recognized that Congress did not have to legislate with absolute preci-
sion when it sought to remedy Equal Protection violations, it con-
cluded that the gap between the amount of state action that Title I of
the ADA prohibited and the requirements that the Constitution im-
posed on the states was too large to make the provision congruent and
proportional to the problem of unconstitutional state discrimination
against disabled employees.119
113. Id.
114. Id. The Court explained: "Even were it possible to squeeze out of these examples a
pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the States, the rights and remedies created by
the ADA against the States would raise the same sort of concerns as to congruence and
proportionality as were found in City ofBoerne." Id.
115. Id. at 966-67 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(5) (B), 12111(9) (1994)).
116. Id. at 967.
117. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (3) (A)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 967-68. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice
O'Connorjoined. Id. at 968-69 (KennedyJ, concurring). Both Justices joined the major-
ity's opinion in full, but wrote separately to extol the virtues of the ADA despite its constitu-
tional flaws. Id. Justice Kennedy had no "doubt that the [ADA] will be a milestone on the
path to a more decent, tolerant, progressive society," creating a legal duty for citizens "to
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B. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg,
issued a dissenting opinion in which he attacked the majority's con-
clusion that Title I lacked both legislative evidence to demonstrate the
existence of a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination and the req-
uisite congruence and proportionality for purposes of the Court's Sec-
tion 5 test.'20 In the evidentiary context, Justice Breyer observed that
the ADA's legislative history contained "powerful evidence of discrimi-
natory treatment throughout society in general.""1 Since "state agen-
cies form part of ... larger society," Justice Breyer observed, "[t]here
is no particular reason to believe that they are immune from the 'ster-
eotypic assumptions' and pattern of 'purposeful unequal treatment'
that Congress found prevalent."' 22 Furthermore, Justice Breyer as-
serted that such an inference was unnecessary, considering that the
task force report from Appendix C contained "roughly 300 examples
of discrimination by state governments themselves."'2 3 He criticized
the majority for dismissing that report because of a lack of indepen-
dent corroboratory evidence.' 24 "[A] legislature is not a court of law,"
Justice Breyer observed, so its evidentiary burden should not be as
strict and Congress should be free to draw general conclusions from
anecdotal accounts of discrimination.' 25 He noted that prior to its
recent Section 5 cases, the Court had never required Congress to in-
vestigate evidence so extensively, nor had it "traditionally required
Congress to make findings as to state discrimination, or to break down
the record evidence, category by category."126
Justice Breyer was also critical of the Court's imposition of ajudi-
cially created restraint-the rational basis test-on Congress.' 27 The
Court had disapproved of such a blurring of the separation-of-powers
doctrine in Cleburne, he noted, out of respect for Congress's institu-
tional role in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. 128 "There is sim-
ply no reason to require Congress, seeking to determine facts relevant
to the exercise of its § 5 authority, to adopt rules or presumptions that
develop a better understanding, a more decent perspective, for accepting persons with
impairments or disabilities into the larger society." Id. at 968.
120. Id. at 969-76 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 970.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 970-71.
125. Id. at 971.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 972-73.
128. Id. at 973.
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reflect a court's institutional limitations," Justice Breyer argued, be-
cause "[u]nlike courts, Congress can readily gather facts from across
the Nation, assess the magnitude of a problem, and more easily find
an appropriate remedy."1 29
Finally, Justice Breyer attacked the Court's determination that Ti-
tle I's "reasonable accommodation" and discriminatory intent provi-
sions rendered it inappropriate Section 5 legislation because its
prohibitions on state action exceeded the minimum constitutional re-
quirements. 130 The fact that the ADA's statutory demands were
stricter than what the Constitution required should not have doomed
the statute, the dissent argued, because, as the Court had long ago
observed, Section 5 "'brought within the domain of congressional
power' whatever 'tends to enforce submission' to its 'prohibitions'
and 'to secure to all persons ... the equal protection of the laws.' "131
Justice Breyer stressed that Congress was entitled to substantial defer-
ence in this context. 3 2 So long as the Court could "perceive a basis
upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did," he ar-
gued, it was not for the Court to second-guess Congress's decision
about where to draw the line between substantive and remedial legis-
lation.1 3 Justice Breyer noted that the Garrett majority paid lip service
to this notion of judicial deference, but that, as in prior Section 5
cases where the Court had made similar statements, its "analysis and
ultimate conclusion deprive [d] its declarations of practical
significance."
13 4
IV. ANALYSIS
In Garrett, the Court once again stripped a federal statute of its
Section 5 underpinning and in so doing strengthened states' Eleventh
Amendment protection. The merits of the majority opinion are best
examined by asking two questions: First, did the Court properly apply
the Section 5 test that it had developed in the City of Boerne line of
cases? And second, is that test a sound one? Justice Breyer's dissent
answered both questions in the negative, but his criticisms pertaining
to the second question were more successful than those related to the
first. His struggles with respect to the first question are attributable to
129. Id.
130. Id. at 974-75.
131. Id. at 974 (quoting ExparteVirginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880)).
132. Id.
133. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301, 324 (1966)).
134. Id. at 975.
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the fact that once one accepts the Section 5 test's validity, even if only
for the sake of argument, it is practically impossible to say that the
majority's holding in Garrett was wrong-the Garrett Court's applica-
tion of the Section 5 formulation comported with the model it had
established in earlier cases, and under that model, the ADA had obvi-
ous Section 5 shortcomings, so to accept that test as valid is to accept
the result. Nevertheless, the test's fundamental flaws make it unwor-
thy of such acceptance in the first place.
A. The Majority's Section 5 Analysis
Because it was obvious, based on the Court's recent Section 5 ju-
risprudence, that the conservative block ofJustices would strictly apply
the Section 5 test in Garrett, the result in the case hinged, for all practi-
cal purposes, on the Court's interpretation of Cleburne.' Signifi-
cantly, many commentators who have analyzed that case have agreed
with Justice Marshall, who, in his separate opinion in Cleburne, con-
cluded that the Court, despite its assertions, must have applied some-
thing stricter than rational basis scrutiny because it would not have
struck down the contested municipal policy if it had applied the tradi-
tional, lenient version of that standard."3 6 Nevertheless, the Garrett
Court perceived no such contradiction when it reviewed Cleburne, con-
cluding instead that traditional rational basis scrutiny was exactly the
standard that the Cleburne Court had endorsed. 37 In so doing, it as-
sured the failure of Title I as Section 5 legislation, for that interpreta-
tion paved the way for the Court's conclusions that: (1) most of the
government discrimination that Congress cited in the ADA's legisla-
tive history was constitutional;3 8 and (2) it was rational for states to
refuse to accommodate their employees' disabilities if they deter-
135. See supra notes 89-101 and accompanying text (discussing Cleburne in further
detail).
136. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 456-58 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part in the judgment and dissenting in part); see also supra notes 99-101 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Marshall's separate opinion in Cleburne). For aca-
demic reaction to Justice Marshall's interpretation, see Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection,
Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 Ky. L.J. 591, 615
(2000) (citing commentaries that supportJustice Marshall's view of Cleburne and observing
that "there seems to be a consensus [among academics] that Cleburne-style rationality re-
view does entail some meaningful degree of judicial scrutiny").
137. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963-64; see also supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text
(discussing the Garrett Court's reading of Cleburne).
138. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 965-66 ("It is telling.., that... Congress assembled only
such minimal evidence of unconstitutional state discrimination in employment against the
disabled.").
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mined that doing so would present an unwanted burden.139 These
conclusions made it practically impossible to prove the existence of a
pattern of unconstitutional state discrimination 40 and meant that all
of the state action that Title I's "reasonable accommodation" provi-
sion had outlawed was constitutional and therefore, most, if not all, of
the requirements that that provision had imposed on the states
crossed the line between substantive and remedial legislation. 141
1. The ADA's Legislative Histoy.-On the question of whether
Congress had demonstrated a pattern of unconstitutional discrimina-
tion against the disabled, Justice Breyer's argument that the Court
should have inferred the existence of state discrimination from a
wider societal problem was without merit, at least in light of the
Court's precedent.142 Granted, the Court conceded that Congress
had supported its claim that "historically, society has tended to isolate
and segregate individuals with disabilities,"1 43 but it went on to note
that Congress had not cited enough examples of discrimination by
states to justify Title I as Section 5 legislation.' 44 Although the ques-
tion of whether the Court should hold to such a standard is debatable,
the Garrett majority's reasoning comported with what the City of Boerne
line of cases requires. In none of those cases did the Court look be-
yond the contested statutes' legislative histories when considering the
extent of the problems Congress had sought to address. Thus, even
though the Garrett majority focused almost exclusively on how states
had been treating the disabled in the years immediately prior to Con-
gress's passage of the ADA in 1990-and thereby seemingly ignored
its own prior admonition that "the propriety of any § 5 legislation
'must be judged with reference to the historical experience .. .it re-
139. See id. at 964 ("States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make
special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions towards such individuals
are rational. They could quite hardheadedly-and perhaps hardheartedly-hold to job
qualification requirements which do not make special allowance for the disabled.").
140. Cf id. at 965 (noting that, while many of the instances that Congress cited in the
ADA's legislative history "evidence an unwillingness on the part of state officials to make
the sort of accommodations for the disabled" that the statute requires, the question
"[w]hether they were irrational under ... Cleburne is more debatable").
141. Cf id. at 967 ("[T]he accommodation duty far exceeds what is constitutionally re-
quired in that it makes unlawful a range of alternate responses that would be reasonable
but would fall short of imposing an 'undue burden' upon the employer.").
142. See id. at 970 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 120-134 and accompanying
text.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (1994); see Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 965.
144. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 965 ("The record assembled by Congress includes many
instances to support [the finding in Section 12101 (a)(2)]. But the great majority of these
incidents do not deal with the activities of States.").
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flects' "145 -it could properly blame Congress for not providing
enough evidence.
Of course, the Court could have attached more weight to the task
force report, which contained hundreds of examples of state disability
discrimination.1 4 6 The majority's argument that, "had Congress truly
understood this information as reflecting a pattern of unconstitu-
tional behavior by the States, one would expect some mention of that
conclusion in the Act's legislative findings" was spurious.1 47 The
Court's prior Section 5 cases cannot be read to require an express
congressional pronouncement that a pattern of constitutional viola-
tions exists. If Congress makes such a statement, all the better; and in
the wake of Garrett and its predecessors, it would be prudent to do so
in the future. But so long as Congress identifies enough examples of
constitutional violations to demonstrate a pattern, it does not have to
take the superfluous step of announcing that pattern's existence.
Nevertheless, even if the Court had never made this ill-conceived ar-
gument, its conclusion that "[a]t most, somewhere around 50 of
the [ ] allegations [in the report] describe conduct that could conceiv-
ably amount to constitutional violations by the States" 14 8 was on point
and suggests that it would not have attached much significance to the
report in any event.
2. Pattern of Unconstitutional Discrimination.-Justice Breyer
countered the Court's congruence and proportionality analysis by ar-
guing that it was for Congress to decide where that line was, and that
the Court had no business second-guessing that determination if the
line had a conceivable basis.' 49 ButJustice Breyer overlooked impor-
tant language from City of Boerne. In that case, although Justice Ken-
nedy conceded that "the line between measures that remedy or
145. Fla. Prepaid Postsec. Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 525
(1997)). The Court's only historical reference was in a footnote, where it acknowledged
that "[t]he record does show that some States, adopting the tenets of the eugenics move-
ment of the early part of this century, required extreme measures such as sterilization of
persons suffering from hereditary mental disease." Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 965 n.6. The Court
was quick to shift the focus back to recent years, however, noting that "there is no indica-
tion that any State had persisted in requiring such harsh measures as of 1990 when the
ADA was adopted." Id.
146. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 977-93 (providing a copy of the task force report); see supra
notes 110-113 and accompanying text (discussing the task force report and the Court's
dismissal of the evidence that it contained).
147. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 966.
148. Id. at 966 n.7.
149. See id. at 974-75; see also supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text (discussing
Justice Breyer's objections to the majority's congruence and proportionality analysis).
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prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substan-
tive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress
must have wide latitude in determining where it lies," he went on to
say that "the distinction exists and must be observed."' 50 This last bit
of language was critical because it suggested that the line has an inde-
pendent, judicially determinable existence that was not affected by
Congress's decision on the matter. The point is best illustrated by
asking: how could the Court judge how well Congress had "observed"
the line if it had not first drawn the line itself? Justice Breyer's argu-
ment cannot provide an answer because he would take more power
out of the hands of the judiciary than City of Boerne permits. In reality,
the "wide latitude" that Congress is due really amounts to a permissi-
ble level of imprecision in its line drawing, for which courts must allow
because, as Justice Kennedy noted in City of Boerne, "[1]egislation
which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the
sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it pro-
hibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into
'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.'" 1 51
Under this proper reading of City of Boerne, Title I would have
congruence and proportionality problems even if it did not include
the "reasonable accommodation" provision. More specifically, consid-
ering the Garrett majority's interpretation of Cleburne, it is safe to con-
clude that, in a number of instances, a state employer could justify as
rational a policy "limiting, segregating, or classifying ajob applicant or
employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of
[that person] . . .because of [a] disability." '152 The fact that all, or
almost all, of the state action prohibited by the "reasonable accommo-
dation" provision was constitutional under the Court's reading of
Cleburne only compounded Title I's Section 5 shortcomings and made
the result in Garrett that much more predictable.
B. Flaws in the Court's Section 5 Formulation
To admit that the Garrett Court may have properly applied its Sec-
tion 5 test based on precedent is not to concede that such precedent
is worthy of being followed. Without Seminole Tribe, for instance,
which commentators have criticized extensively,'1 3 it would have been
150. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20.
151. Id. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (1994).
153. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 968 (2000)
("Seminole Tribe was clearly wrongly decided."); Henry Paul Monaghan, Comment, The Sov-
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sufficient for purposes of Eleventh Amendment abrogation that Con-
gress passed Title I pursuant to its Commerce Clause power.'54 Signif-
icantly, all of the dissenting Justices in Garrett continue to reject the
part of Seminole Tribe that foreclosed that means of abrogation. 55 Nev-
ertheless, in his Garrett dissent, Justice Breyer chose not to restate his
objections to Seminole Tribe. Instead, he assumed the validity of the
decision in that case and attacked only the Section 5 part of the
Court's Eleventh Amendment equation. 156  In this context, Justice
Breyer properly focused on the awkward role that the Court's Equal
Protection jurisprudence had played in Kimel and Garrett.
In typical Equal Protection cases, the Court applies one of its
three standards to assess the constitutionality of a state action that a
plaintiff is directly challenging. 157 If rational basis is the appropriate
standard, then the Court identifies the discriminatory state action and
considers whether the asserted justifications for the provision are ra-
tionally related to a legitimate governmental interest. 158 This formu-
lation is unremarkable, of course, but it highlights how differently the
Court uses the Equal Protection standards in its Section 5 cases. In
that context, the Court, at least in theory, takes something of an inven-
tory of all the instances of state discrimination that Congress cites in a
contested statute's legislative history and considers those instances
under the appropriate Equal Protection standard.159
There are separation-of-powers considerations that caution
against this approach, which Justice Breyer discussed in his dissent; he
argued powerfully that it was not for the Court to, in effect, impose
rules of judicial restraint on Congress. 160 As two commentators re-
cently explained, "the considerations of 'judicial restraint' that shape
ereign Immunity "Exception, " 110 H~Av. L. REv. 102, 133 (1996) ("The majority's devotion to
this doctrine of state sovereign immunity is ... mystifying. In the end, Seminole Tribe simply
perpetuates a questionable line of reasoning .... " (footnote omitted)).
154. Cf supra notes 31-36 (discussing Seminole Tribe and its effect on Congress's abroga-
tion power).
155. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 93 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part) ("In my opinion, Congress' power to authorize federal reme-
dies against state agencies that violate federal statutory obligations is coextensive with its
power to impose those obligations on the States in the first place. Neither the Eleventh
Amendment nor the doctrine of sovereign immunity places any limit on that power.").
Justice Stevens's Kimel dissent was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at
92.
156. See supra notes 120-134 (reviewing Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Garrett).
157. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 114-119 and accompanying text (discussing the Garrett Court's ex-
amination of the ADA's legislative history).
160. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 974-75 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
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and guide rational basis review are specifically designed to prevent
courts from intruding on legislative discretion, they ought not to pre-
vent Congress from applying the prohibition against invidious dis-
crimination in a procedurally different and more comprehensive way
than a court." '161
But these institutional concerns are not the only problem with
the manner in which the Court has interjected rational basis review
into its Section 5 cases; its method also makes it practically impossible
for courts to scrutinize each state action as closely as they would in a
typical Equal Protection case, where courts usually consider the merits
of only one law. By the same token, the parties in a Section 5 case are
in a much worse position in attacking or defending the discriminatory
state actions cited in a statute's legislative history than are the parties
in a standard case. That is, in a typical Equal Protection case involving
the rational basis test, a plaintiff claims injury resulting from a discrim-
inatory government action."' Because the law's constitutionality is
one of the direct issues in the case, the parties submit evidence re-
garding what interests the state sought to further when it passed the
challenged law and whether the law was rationally related to those
interests. 6 3 But a plaintiff in a Section 5 case does not have a similar
opportunity, at least not as a practical matter. If Congress cites 200
examples of potentially unconstitutional state action in a statute's leg-
islative history, for instance, a plaintiff seeking to defend that statute
as Section 5 legislation cannot possibly offer evidence to attack the
constitutionality of all of those cited examples. Instead, courts end up
predicting whether they would find those state laws unconstitutional.
This process is inherently arbitrary, and any conclusions that
courts draw are necessarily general. The discriminatory city ordi-
nance at issue in Cleburne illustrates the point. If that law had been
one of hundreds of discriminatory provisions cited by Congress in a
Section 5 statute's legislative history, would a reviewing court have
looked at it on its face and decided that it was irrational? Without the
specific evidence regarding the city's asserted interests that the
Cleburne Court was able to consider, the answer is probably "no."'16 4 It
is not surprising, then, that the Kimel and Garrett Courts both con-
161. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 467 (2000).
162. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435-39 (1985)
(discussing the municipal zoning ordinance at issue in the case).
163. See, e.g., id. at 447-50 (discussing the asserted justifications for the zoning ordinance
and considering the merits of that ordinance under the rational basis test).
164. For discussion of the evidence presented, see Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447-50.
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cluded that most of the examples of state discrimination that Con-
gress cited in the ADEA and the ADA, respectively, were constitutional
and that neither statute responded to the requisite pattern of discrimi-
nation."' Additionally, because it would be equally predictable if the
Court draws the same conclusion in future Section 5 cases involving
federal civil rights statutes that-like the ADEA and ADA-protect
groups that are not suspect or quasi-suspect for Equal Protection pur-
poses, it is an open question whether Congress can now ever abrogate
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity with such statutes. 166
V. CONCLUSION
One of the ADA's congressional sponsors has referred to it as an
"emancipation proclamation" for the disabled.'67 There is no doubt
that that the statute has provided disabled individuals unprecedented
legal protections. But the Garrett Court eroded those protections by
scrutinizing the ADA under its controversial Eleventh Amendment
formula, which only five of the Court's current Justices accept as valid
and which includes the ill-conceived Section 5 test. The requirements
of that test are clear, as the Court has now applied it in numerous
cases. In Garrett, the Court did not deviate from that familiar model.
Thus, the result in Garrett is difficult to criticize if one considers the
opinion on these narrow terms. But to do so is insufficient because
the Court's Section 5 test is inherently flawed and is unworthy of con-
tinued application. The Court should retool its Section 5 test so that
it is more deferential to Congress's unique institutional role in enforc-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees.
MARK A. JOHNSON
165. See supra notes 67-72 (reviewing the Kimel Court's discussion of ADEA's legislative
history); supra notes 114-119 and accompanying text (discussing the Garrett Court's exami-
nation of the ADA's legislative history).
166. See Post & Siegel, supra note 161, at 461 ("If the exercise of congressional Section 5
power must be congruent and proportional to behavior that a court would hold unconsti-
tutional under rational basis review, virtually all antidiscrimination legislation, except that
protecting racial minorities and women, will be rendered beyond Congress's Section 5
power.").
167. Tom Harkin, Our Newest Civil Rights Law-The Americans With Disabilities Act, 26
TRIAL 56 (1990).
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